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Introduction—The Corruption Crackdown 
Corruption is a world-wide issue1, and recently it has been receiving world-wide attention.2  
Realistically, the issue of corruption may be best described as a “you know it when you see it” 
phenomenon.3 Although a universal definition of corruption most certainly does not exist,4 one 
suggested definition of the term provides that at the very least, “corruption includes the misuse of 
public office for personal gain, bribery, extortion, and other misappropriations of public and 
private assets.”5 Recognizing the difficulty in defining corruption, the World Bank developed 
interpretive guidelines to assist the analysis.6 The guidelines highlight the expansive scope and the 
inherent vagueness that encompasses the issue by distinguishing between “corrupt practices,” 
“fraudulent practices,” “coercive practices,” “collusive practices,” and “obstructive practices.”7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2009, available at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009 (last visited Apr. 25, 2010) [hereinafter 
Corruption Perception Index 2009]; MARK PIETH ET AL., THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY: A COMMENTARY 
(2007). 
2TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT (2009), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/global_corruption_report/gcr2009 (“The Global Corruption 
Report 2009 discusses the most promising tools to tackle corruption in business, identifies pressing areas for reform 
and outlines how companies, governments, investors, consumers and other stakeholders can contribute to raising 
corporate integrity and meeting the challenges that corruption poses to sustainable economic growth and 
development.”) [hereinafter GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2009]; The World Bank, Public Sector Governance, 
Anticorruption, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/EXTANTIC
ORRUPTION/0,,menuPK:384461~pagePK:149018~piPK:149093~theSitePK:384455,00.html (last visited Apr. 22, 
2010). 
3 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTION ON CORRUPTION, GMC (98) 40 
(Dec. 1, 1998), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/explainrpt.pdf (explaining that “[e]ven if 
no common definition has yet been found by the international community to describe corruption as such, everyone 
seems at least to agree that certain political, social or commercial practices are corrupt”) [hereinafter COE 
EXPLANATORY REPORT]. 
4 This is partially a result of the significant cultural differences that exist among the world’s citizens and nations. COE 
EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 3.  
5 Ethan S. Burger & Mary S. Holland, Why the Private Sector is Likely to Lead the Next Stage in the Global Fight 
Against Corruption, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 45, 45-46 (2006).  
6 World Bank, Definitions and Interpretive Guidelines, Sept. 21, 2009, 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/anticorruption.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/Definitions_Interpretive_Guidelines_Jan_2007/$FIL
E/Definitions_Interpretive_Guidelines.pdf. 
7 Id.   
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Under the guidelines, “a ‘corrupt practice’ is the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, directly 
or indirectly, of anything of value to influence improperly the actions of another party.”8  
In the United States of America (USA), the corruption crackdown appears to be much more 
than a mere trend, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)9 is the American statute that is 
fueling the development.10 From 1978 to 2000, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) averaged only three prosecutions a year under the Act.11 2007 
was described as a “watershed year for FCPA enforcement;”12 however, since then, the frequency 
of federal prosecutions under the Act has only grown.13 As explained in Gibson Dunn’s 2009 
Year-End FCPA Update, “[i]n what is becoming nearly an annual event, 2009 once again saw 
record levels of FCPA enforcement actions brought by [the] DOJ and the SEC.”14 The report 
called it “clichéd to continuously hype… the enduring explosion of FCPA prosecutions.”15 Clichéd 
or not, the increases in the number of enforcement actions brought by the SEC and DOJ, the 
increasing magnitude of the penalties imposed, the prosecution of individuals, CEO’s and board 
members in addition to their corporations, the prosecution of domestic and foreign intermediaries, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Id.   
9 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 
78dd-3, 78ff (1998). 
10 Christopher M. Matthews, Mendelsohn and Scarboro Spread the FCPA Gospel, MAIN JUSTICE, Mar. 23, 2010, 
http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/03/23/mendelsohn-and-scarboro-spread-the-fcpa-gospel/(summarizing and 
compiling statements made by DOJ and SEC officials regarding the recent FCPA enforcement trend). 
11 Priya Cherian Huskins, FCPA Prosecutions: Liability Trend to Watch, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1450 (2008); Eugene R. Erbstoesser et al., The FCPA and Analogous Foreign Anti-Bribery 
Laws—Overview, Recent Developments, and Acquisition Due Diligence, 2 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 381, 386 (2007). 
12 Fenwick & West, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The Next Corporate Scandal?, Jan. 28, 2008 
http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/Publications/Litigation/sec/Sec_Litigation_Alert_01-28-08.pdf. 
13 Gibson Dunn, 2009 Year-End FCPA Update, Jan. 4, 2010, 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/Publications/Pages/2009Year-EndFCPAUpdate.aspx [hereinafter 2009 FCPA Update]. 
The report does not contain page numbers; therefore, subsequent footnotes will reference the subheading of the 
specific section referenced in the report.  
14 Id. at 2009 Year-End Figures. 
15 Id.   
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and the overall “aggressive new enforcement theories,”16 are significant. 17  The FCPA’s new 
attention is undoubtedly creating a multitude of questions for corporations and directors on how to 
avoid FCPA liability.18  
In addition to the domestic crackdown, “the world’s international organizations ha[ve] moved 
dramatically to established strong policies in favor of transparency in government and against 
corruption and bribery.”19 Anti-corruption efforts are increasingly becoming global.20 For example, 
member states to the Organization of American States (OAS)21  signed the Inter-American 
Convention Against Corruption treaty (OAS Convention), which entered into force on March 6, 
1997.22 Member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD)23 signed the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD 
Convention), which entered into force on February 15, 199924. The Council of Europe (COE)25 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Allan Verman Yap Ong, The Rise of the Prosecutorial Efforts in Foreign Corruption: Lessons Learned from Recent 
FCPA Cases (Mar. 24, 2010) (Colum. J. Asian L. working paper series, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1577444)  
[hereinafter Yap Ong]. 
17 2009 FCPA Update, supra note 13, at 2009’s Top Six Developments in FCPA Enforcement; Yap Ong, supra, note 
16; Jeffrey Cramer, Commentary: The FCPA Game Has Changed: Trends in Enforcement, MAIN JUSTICE, Apr. 23, 
2010, http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/04/23/commentary-the-fcpa-game-has-changed-trends-in-enforcement/. 
18 See generally 2009 FCPA Update, supra note 13.   
19 UHY Advisors, International Drive to Eliminate Corruption, http://www.uhyadvisors-
us.com/uhy/Default.aspx?tabid=391 (last visited Mar. 31, 2010). 
20 David E. Dworsky, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 671, 690-694 (2009). 
21 The OAS includes 33 member nations all located in the Western Hemisphere, excluding Cuba. Organization of 
American States, http://www.oas.org (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).  
22 Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724, 
available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-58.html [hereinafter OAS Convention].   
23 The OECD has 30 members and 8 non-member observers. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, http://www.oecd.org (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).  
24 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf [hereinafter OECD Convention]. 
25 The Council of Europe includes 47 member states and 5 observer nations. The Council of Europe, 
http://www.coe.int/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).  
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enacted the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (COE Convention) on July 1, 2002.26 
Additionally, in 2005, the United Nations General Assembly signed the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption (U.N. Convention).27 Similarly, the Member States of the African 
Union28 enacted the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption in 
August, 2006.29 Finally, the World Bank, through its Department of Institutional Integrity and as 
part of its Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project, released governance indicators, 
beginning in 1996, for two hundred and twelve countries and territories in six categories, 
including: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.30 Although the 
effectiveness of these specific policies and treaties are debatable,31 they are nonetheless developing 
greater significance in the international business marketplace.32 Additionally, since these 
conventions are not self-executing, meaning that they call for member states to enact domestic 
laws in accordance with the guidelines established under the conventions, the benefits flowing 
from such international agreements will take time to accrue. Also, even once member countries 
enact such laws, in light of the thirty year time period that passed between the FCPA being enacted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1997, 38 I.L.M. 505, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=173&CM=8&DF=10/11/2007&CL=ENG 
[hereinafter COE Convention]. 
27 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Dec. 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 37, available at 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf [hereinafter U.N. 
Convention]. 
28 The African Union has fifty three members.  African Union, http://www.africa-union.org/ (last visited Apr. 12, 
2010).  
29 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, Adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of the Union, July 11, 2003, available at http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Convention%20on%20Combating%20Corruption.pdf.  
30 The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2010).  
31 See generally Burger, supra note 5, at 52 (suggesting that perhaps as governments realize that other governments are 
taking their treaty commitments seriously, they will be more willing to investigate and prosecute bribery); Dworsky, 
supra note 20, at 699.  
32 International Drive to Eliminate Corruption, supra note 19.  
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in the USA and it being enforced with any real frequency,33 it will likely take time for the 
developing foreign laws to be seriously enforced as well.34  
In 2008, Ernst and Young sought to better understand “how companies are managing the risks 
associated with bribery of government officials outside their home countries” by questioning 
almost 1200 major companies from thirty three countries.35 According to Ernst and Young’s 2008 
Corruption or Compliance—Weighing the Costs, 10th Global Fraud Survey, only one third of the 
survey’s respondents claimed some awareness of the FCPA and fifty eight percent of senior in-
house council answered that they were not familiar with the Act.36 Considering the recent 
corruption crackdown and the international media attention it is receiving, more respondents would 
arguably be familiar with the Act today. However, for any number of reasons, despite the recent 
crackdown, the prevalence of corruption does not appear to be diminishing.37 Historically, 
corruption is not a new phenomenon,38 and unfortunately, “[a]berrational behavior is inevitable in 
organizations, large and small.”39 As provided in the Ernst and Young survey, one fourth of 
respondents stated that their company “had experienced an incident of bribery and corruption in 
the past two years,” twenty three percent “knew that someone in their company had been solicited 
to pay a bribe to win or retain business,” eighteen percent “knew that their company had lost 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 See generally, Bruce Carton, FCPA Enforcement in 2010: Prepare for Blastoff, SECURITIES DOCKET, Mar. 10, 2010, 
http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2010/03/10/fcpa-enforcement-in-2010-prepare-for-blastoff/.  
34 Dworsky, supra note 20, at 699. 
35 2008 Ernst and Young, Corruption or Compliance—Weighing the Costs, 10th  
Global Fraud Survey, available at 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/FIDS_10th_Global_Fraud_Survey/$FILE/Corruption_or_compliance_w
eighing_the_costs.pdf. (last visited Apr. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Global Fraud Survey]. Survey respondents included 
CFO’s, senior internal audit directors, CEO’s, COO’s, heads of legal, compliance and strategy, audit committee 
directors and other board members. Id.   
36 Id.  
37 Id.; see also, Burger, supra note 5, at 46 (suggesting that “despite anticorruption norms and global 
attention…corruption thrives; and globalization has created vast new opportunities for it”).  
38 Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues, 35 J. OF ECON. LIT. 1320, 1320 (1997) 
(describing corruption as an ancient problem); J.T. NOONAN, BRIBES (1984). 
39 Global Fraud Survey, supra note 35, at 1. 
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business to a competitor who had paid a bribe,” and most notably, more than one third “felt that 
corrupt business practices were getting worse.”40  
In conjunction with the FCPA’s new attention, the Act is receiving increased, though not 
necessarily new,41 criticism. One realm of criticism focuses on the generally ineffective 
enforcement of corruption, specifically international bribery, through the Act.42 Many academics 
have made suggestions on how to remedy the reality of this ineffective enforcement.43 This note 
will analyze some of these suggestions before concluding that the FCPA should be amended to 
include a broad private right of action. Part I highlights the ongoing battle against corruption. Part 
II introduces the FCPA.  Part III discusses challenges currently hindering effective enforcement 
under the FCPA.  Part IV establishes the need for a private right of action under the Act. Finally, 
Part V provides a remedy for improving enforcement. This note does not in any way attempt to 
argue that by amending the Act, either corruption or bribery will be completely eradicated. 
Furthermore, this note recognizes the serious implications private plaintiffs might suffer from 
bringing FCPA claims. As a result, this note acknowledges that merely providing a private right by 
no means guarantees that private plaintiffs will bring FCPA claims with any predictable frequency. 
Corruption and international bribery is an unsolvable problem; realistically, the goal must be to 
suppress and control corruption by creating greater deterrents and access to the judicial system, not 
eliminate it completely. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Id. at 2.  
41 See infra Part V.B. 
42 See infra Parts III and IV. 
43 See infra Part V.B.. 
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I. The  Battle Against Corruption 
Corruption is not an issue that only affects select nations, industries, or peoples,44 and although 
extremely difficult to establish with any sort of mathematical certainty, in today’s society, the 
prevalence of corruption seems only to be expanding.45 In fact, it is a popular assertion that 
“[d]espite anticorruption norms and global attention… corruption thrives; and globalization has 
created vast new opportunities for it.”   Bribery is but one facet of corruption; however, it appears 
to be a costly one. The World Bank estimates that over one trillion dollars are paid world-wide in 
bribes each year.  Bribery has been described as a “widespread phenomenon in international 
business transactions…which raises serious moral and political concerns, undermines good 
governance and economic development, and distorts international competitive conditions.”46  
A. Two Sides of Every Bribe 
To begin with, it must be recognized that there are two parties and two sides to any bribe. 
These two sides are referred to as the supply side and the demand side.47 “The demand side of 
bribery refers to demands or requests for bribes by public officials; the supply side of bribery 
refers to offers of bribes to public officials. A corrupt transaction can be initiated in either way.”48 
Taking into account issues of extraterritorialism, domestic laws and international agreements 
frequently only support prosecution of the supply side of a bribe, despite the possibility that “most 
bribes are initiated by demand.”49 If it is in fact true that most bribes are initiated by public 
officials, then it provides some support for the conclusion that the current anti-bribery statutes, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 OAS Convention, supra note 22, pmbl.  
45 COE EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 3, intro. 
46 OECD Convention, supra note 24, pmbl. 
47 Steven R. Salbu, Information Technology in the War Against International Bribery and Corruption: The Next 
Frontier of Institutional Reform, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67, 69 n. 13 (2001). 
48 Id.  
49 Id.; see e.g., United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. Tex. 1991) (holding that foreign officials, who were the 
recipients of bribes, could not be prosecuted for conspiring to commit bribery under the FCPA).  
10	  
	  
including the FCPA, are an inefficient means of prohibiting corrupt business practices because 
they are “poorly matched to the underlying realities of corrupt transactions.”50  
B. The Need for Multi-layered Policies  
Because corruption is a multi-faceted dilemma,51 it has been suggested that the only way to 
effectively limit corruption is by utilizing “multi-layered policies”52 or measures.53 These include: 
“prevention,” “enforcement,” “State building,” and “instilling cultural values that will reinforce 
prevention, enforcement, and State building.”54 Prevention incorporates “the enactment and 
implementation of legislation and administrative regulations that choke off corrupt practices.”55 
Enforcement is needed in order to “deter future misconduct by investigating and prosecuting 
existing corruption.”56 State building “consists of institutional reforms designed to create a society 
of laws” and the building of “a transparent, accountable, and durable legal, economic, and political 
foundation.”57 Last, the cultural dimension “involves transmitting positive values and norms” into 
the business marketplace and serves to strengthen and support the other three policies.58  
C. The USA’s Fight Against Corruption 
Internationally, the USA is a member state to the OAS and signed the OAS Convention on 
March 19, 1996.59 The Senate’s advice and consent was given July 27, 2000 and formal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Salbu, supra note 47, at 102. 
51 Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & Fritz Heimann, The Long War Against Corruption, 85 FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2006, at 
75, 76, available at http://www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/War_against_Corruption_FA.pdf [hereinafter The Long War]. 
52 Burger, supra note 5, at 50.  
53 The Long War, supra note 51, at 2. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 OAS convention, supra note 22. 
11	  
	  
ratification is pending.60 In addition, the USA is a member state to the OECD.61 The USA signed 
the OECD’s Convention December 17, 1997, the Senate’s advice and consent was given July 31, 
1998, and formal ratification occurred December 8, 1998.62 Last, the USA, as a non-member state 
of the COE,63 signed the COE Convention on October 10, 2000.64 
Moreover, thirty-seven American states65 have enacted laws prohibiting bribery in the 
commercial context.66 Although the laws’ specifics vary from state to state,67 to the extent that 
these laws “encompass the bribery of any agent of a principal or an employee of an employer,” 
foreign bribery may be prosecuted under such laws so long as “the foreign official is viewed as an 
agent or employee of his government.”68 These state laws may also form the basis of prosecution 
under federal laws dealing with corruption.69 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Senate Resolution Advising and Consenting to the Treaty on Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,     S. 
TREATY DOC. NO 105-39 (2000), as reprinted in 146 CONG. REC. S 7809, D 840, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/senate-resolute.pdf.  
61 OECD Convention, supra note 24. 
62 See Department of Justice, FCPA, International Agreements Relating to Bribery of Foreign Officials, OECD, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/intlagree/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2010); Response of the United 
States Questions Concerning Phase 2, at A.F.1, A.F.2., http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response1.pdf 
(last visited May 5, 2010) [hereinafter USA OECD Phase 2 Response]. 
63 Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Chart of renewal of declarations or reservations, 
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/treaties/html/173-1.htm#ART38 (last visited May 5, 2010). 
64 See Department of Justice, FCPA, International Agreements Relating to Bribery of Foreign Officials, COE, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/intlagree/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2010). 
65 See Ala. Code §§ 13A-11-120, -121; Alaska Stat. §§ 11.46.660 - .670; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-2605; Cal. Penal 
Code §641.3; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-5-401; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§53a-160, -161; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 881-882; 
Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 838.15-.16; Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 709-880; Ill. Com. Stat. Ann., ch. 720, §§ 5/29A-1, A-2; Iowa 
Code Ann. § 722.10; Kan. Stat. Ann. §21-4405; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 518.020 -.030; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14:73; 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 904; Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 271, § 39; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.125; Minn. Stat. 
Ann. §609.86; Miss. Code Ann. § 97-9-10; Mo. Ann. Stat. §570.150; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-613; Nev. Rev.Stat. Ann. § 
207.295; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 638:7; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:21-10; N.Y. Penal Law §§180.00 - .08; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
14-353; N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-12-08; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §4108; R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-7-3, -4; S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 16-17-540; S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 22-43-1, -2; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.43; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-508; 
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-444; Wash.Rev. Code Ann. §9A.68.060; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 134.05. 
66 USA OECD Phase 2 Response, supra note 62, at B.1.2. 
67 Id.; Norton Rose Group, Business ethics and anti-corruption, An introduction to the law of bribery and corruption, 
http://www.nortonrose.com/expertise/businessethicsandanticorruption/default18514.aspx?lang=en-gb (last visited May 
4, 2010). 
68 Norton Rose Group, supra note 67.   
69 See United States v. Mead, Cr. 98-240-01 (D.N.J. 1998)(NJ state law served as basis for a federal Travel Act 
prosecution).  
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Additionally, international bribery may serve as the predicate act for a civil Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act70 (RICO) action 71 and to the Money Laundering 
Control Act.72 Moreover, the Travel Act73 and the federal mail74 and wire fraud statutes75 may be 
implicated by criminal corruption investigations.76 The primary federal anti-bribery statute is the 
FCPA, which the remainder of this note will focus on.   
II. The FCPA 
A. History 
As already explained, the FCPA is the federal statute that is fueling the current corruption 
crackdown. In the early 1970’s, SEC investigations, assisted by private disclosures, shed public 
light on the magnitude of corrupt business practices American companies engaged in both 
domestically and internationally .77 Congress determined that international bribery was a serious 
detriment to both domestic markets and foreign relations.78 Beginning in 1976, bills were 
introduced to make bribery of foreign public officials illegal.79 The original FCPA was introduced 
by Senators William Proxmire and Harrison A. Williamson on January 18, 1977, and passed by 
both the House and Senate in December, 1977.80 The Act’s stated purpose was to end “the bribery 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961- 68 (2000). 
71 Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428, 440 (D.D.C. 1992) (allowing a 
plaintiff’s FCPA violation claim to serve as a predicate for his civil RICO action). 
72 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1961-1964 (1988); USA OECD Phase 2 Response, supra note 62, at B.1.2. 
73 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1988). 
74 18 U.S.C. § 1341(2002). 
75 18 U.S.C. § 1343(2002). 
76 Norton Rose Group, supra note 67. 
77 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13185 (Jan. 19, 1977); S. REP. NO. 95-114 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4098 [hereinafter 1976 FCPA Senate Report]; Veronica Ann Deberardine, Foreign 
Corrupt Practices: Creating an Exception to the Act of State Doctrine, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 203, 220-22 (1984). 
78 1976 FCPA Senate Report, supra note 77. 
79 Id.   
80 Id.  
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of foreign officials and to restore public confidences in the integrity of the American business 
system.”81  
The FCPA was first amended in 1988.82 The amendments raised the penalties for violating the 
Act, attempted to clarify the knowledge requirement, and added affirmative defenses and an 
exception for grease or facilitating payments.83 The 1998 amendments were necessary after the 
member states to the OECD, including the USA, signed the OECD Convention.84 Pursuant to the 
OECD Convention, the 1998 amendments expanded the FCPA’s jurisdictional reach to include 
non-American entities and persons acting within the USA, and to American entities and persons 
acting outside the USA.85 Prior to the 1998 amendments, a primary complaint of the FCPA was 
that it placed American companies at a competitive disadvantage because it held them to a higher 
ethical standard and hindered their ability to effectively compete for international business due to 
the threat of federal prosecution.86 The 1998 amendments were a response to this criticism, and 
arguably helped “level the playing field” for American companies who were competing in the 
globalized economy.87 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 United States Department of Justice, Lay Person’s Guide to the FCPA Statue, June 2001, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/dojdocb.html [hereinafter Lay-Person’s Guide].   
82 Id.; Trade and Competitiveness Act, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 
1988 H.R. 4848 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 FCPA Amendment]. 
83 1988 FCPA Amendment, supra note 82; Matt A Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery: 
Expanding the Scope of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. J ON LEGIS. 425 (2009). Grease 
or facilitating payments are payments made “to a foreign official, political party, or party official the purpose of which 
is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action by a foreign official, political party, or 
party official.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1. 
84 OECD Convention, supra note 21; H.R. REP. NO. 105-802 (1998) (House Commerce Committee to accompany H.R. 
4353) [hereinafter H.R. REP. NO. 802]. 
85 H.R. REP. NO. 802, supra note 84, at 18-20; Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 81; 15 U.S.C. §78dd-1 – dd-3. 
86 H.R. REP. NO. 802, supra note 84; Paul V. Gerlach, Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, Testimony concerning H.R. 4353, The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition 
Act of 1998 before the Subcommittee on Finance and Hazardous Materials, United States House of Representatives 
(Sept. 10, 1998), 1998 WL 778822 (F.D.C.H.) [hereinafter Gerlach Testimony]. 
87 H.R. REP. NO. 802, supra note 84; Gerlach Testimony, supra note 86. 
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B. Provisions 
There are two main provisions of the act: the anti-bribery and accounting provisions.88 In 
general, the anti-bribery provisions “prohibit companies and individuals from paying or promising 
to pay foreign officials anything of value with the corrupt intent of obtaining or retaining 
business.” 89 According to the DOJ, “there are five elements which must be met to constitute a 
violation of the Act.”90 First is the “who” element; the FCPA applies to “issuers,” “domestic 
concerns,” and “any person other than issuers or domestic concerns” who corruptly uses USA 
mails or instrumentalities of interstate commerce to bribe foreign officials.91 Second is the “corrupt 
intent” element; it must be intended that the payment “induce the recipient to misuse his official 
position.”92 The third element is the “payment” requirement, which has been interpreted to mean 
“money or anything of value,” with “anything of value” being very broadly interpreted.93 Fourth is 
the “recipient” element; under the Act either the direct or indirect recipient of the bribe must a 
foreign official, which is also broadly defined.94 The final element is the “business purpose test.”95 
“Payments made in order to assist the firm in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or 
directing business to, any person” are prohibited.96 Like other terms, the DOJ interprets “obtaining 
or retaining business” broadly.97 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 – 78dd-3, 78ff; Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 81. 
89 Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 81. See also the anti-bribery provisions at 15 U.S.C. §§78dd-1 – dd-3 (1998). 
90 Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 81. 
91 Id.  
92 Id.   
93 Id.; see e.g., Kay v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 42 (2008), reh’g denied, 2008 WL 5046518 ( 2008). 
94 Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 81. 
95 Id.  
96 Id.   
97 Id.; Kenneth Winer & Gregory Husisian, Recent Opinion Sheds Light on the Relevance 
Of Due Diligence to the FCPA’s ‘‘Knowledge’’ Requirement,  4 CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY REP., Nov. 13, 2009, 
http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/6597/CorporateAccount2009.pdf. 
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 The accounting provisions were enacted as an amendment to section 13(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.98 The provisions impose duties on “issuers,” defined as “a corporation that 
has issued securities that have been registered in the United States or who is required to file 
periodic reports with the SEC,”99 to keep books and records that accurately reflect transactions and 
dispositions of assets and to develop and maintain a reliable internal system of accounting.100  
C. Enforcement 
Congress designated enforcement of the FCPA to both the SEC and the DOJ.101 The joint 
enforcement responsibility reflected Congress’s recognition that granting sole enforcement to the 
DOJ would cause unnecessary duplication since the SEC already possessed investigative authority 
under the federal securities laws, had particular expertise and success in investigating violations of 
the securities laws, and maintained a politically independent position from the DOJ.102 The DOJ is 
responsible for all criminal enforcement, under both the accounting and anti-bribery provisions, 
and for civil enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions.103 The SEC is responsible for civil 
enforcement of the accounting provisions.104 
There is no express private right of action included in the Act,105 and it has been judicially 
determined that there is also no implied private right of action;106 however, there was considerable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (1998). 
99 Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 81. 
10015 U.S.C. § 78q (1982). 
101 1976 FCPA Senate Report, supra note 77.  
102 Id.   
103 Lay-person’s Guide, supra note 81. 
104 Id.   
105 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 – dd-3, 78ff. 
106 See, e.g., Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1086 (1991); Citicorp 
Int’l Trading Co. v. Western Oil & Refining Co., 771 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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congressional debate over whether there should be such a right in the Act’s legislative history.107 
As originally drafted, the House’s version of the FCPA included a private right of action.108 
Additionally, after the Act was enacted, the SEC General Counsel stated that the Act did in fact 
imply a private right of action.109 Despite this interesting legislative history, private litigants 
currently are not afforded a private right of action. Therefore, sole enforcement authority rests with 
the DOJ and SEC. In light of this, private parties harmed by FCPA prohibited conduct have had to 
resort to alternative means in order to receive a remedy for the alleged FCPA violations.110 
III. FCPA Enforcement Challenges 
A logical thought after reading of the recent corruption crackdown would be that bribery is 
being eradicated and that the fight to develop or return integrity to the business world is being 
won. However, this is not the case.111 The argument has been made that although the number of 
FCPA prosecutions is on the increase, when this value is compared with the underlying sum of 
bribes being effectuated world-wide, companies and individuals are actually only being held 
responsible for a very small percentage of bribes.112 To some, for example those that believe that 
paying bribes or making other “gentlemen-type” agreements is standard business practice,113 this 
assertion that corruption is in fact more prevalent than ever comes as no surprise. To others, such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 S.R. 1031, 94th Cong. (2d Sess. 1976); H.R. 640, 95th Cong. (1st Sess. 1977) (providing that Congress indicated 
that it intended courts to imply a private cause of action under the Act). 
108 Lamb, 915 F.2d. at 1025. 
109 Opinion of the General Counsel on the Existence of a Private Right of Action Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1977, [1978 Transfer Binder]  Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 81,071, at 80,806 (Sept. 6, 1976). 
110 See infra Part IV.A. 
111 Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2009, 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/gcb2009 (explaining that the Barometer “presents the main 
findings of a public opinion survey that explores the general public’s views of corruption, as well as experiences of 
bribery around the world. It assesses the extent to which key institutions and public services are perceived to be 
corrupt, measures citizens’ views on government efforts to fight corruption, and this year, for the first time, includes 
questions about the level of state capture and people’s willingness to pay a premium for clean corporate behaviour.”) 
[hereinafter Corruption Barometer]. 
112 Burger, supra note 5, at 47.  
113 Corruption Barometer, supra note 111, at 15. 
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as those who believe that corrupt business practices directly and negatively seriously affect many 
other important issues, such as the global financial crises, poverty, or human rights violations,114 
this is a concerning and disheartening reality. Still others, perhaps falling somewhere between the 
two groups just mentioned, appreciate the modern reality of business transactions and the prevalent 
culture of paying bribes, but recognize that if the bribery of public officials is not controlled the 
future global business marketplace will be too significantly harmed and positive growth and 
development will be too extensively stunted. This group believes that merely prosecuting 
companies or individuals who engage in such bribery after the fact is an ineffective deterrent 
because both the immediate and long-run harm is still suffered and the proceeds of the bribe are 
nearly impossible to recover.115 Additionally, this group respects the current corruption crackdown 
in theory, but believes there are numerous inefficiencies standing in the way of an actual, long-run 
solution to global bribery.116  
Although the enactment,117 and arguably even the recent increased enforcement118 of the 
FCPA, was “reactionary rather than preventive,” and even though one purpose of the Act is to 
punish those that engage in illegal business practices, another important purpose is to “deter [the] 
same type of conduct in the future.”119 There are many possible reasons why the “preventive” goal 
of the FCPA is not always accomplished.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 The World Bank, Governance and Anti-Corruption, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20040922~menuPK:34480~pagePK:34370~
theSitePK:4607,00.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2010); Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/ (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
115See generally Vega, supra note 83; Burger, supra note 5.  
116 See generally Vega, supra note 83; Burger, supra note 5. 
117 The FCPA was enacted after the Watergate scandal received national attention. 1976 FCPA Senate Report, supra 
note 77. 
118 David Hess & Cristie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings: A New Approach to an Old 
Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 307, 308 (2008).  
119 William Allen Nelson II, Attorney Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Legal and Ethical 
Challenges and Solutions, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 255, 258 (2009). 
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A. Resources 
First, both the SEC and DOJ have suffered from a lack of necessary resources,120 thus 
explaining why traditionally only the easy and most obvious FCPA cases were prosecuted.121 The 
SEC and DOJ both heavily rely on and encourage companies to make voluntary disclosures of 
possible FCPA violations.122 Also, government law enforcement inherently has “competing 
priorities” and government agencies “sometimes have inconsistent priories.”123 This is relevant 
because under the FCPA, in some circumstances, the DOJ and SEC must work together in their 
prosecution attempts.124  
B. Evidence 
Moreover, while engaging in suspicious activities, companies do not flaunt their potentially 
prohibited conduct; instead, they work hard to keep their conduct secret.125 This reality was 
recognized as early as the fourth century B.C. by Kautiliya, who wrote, “Just as fish moving under 
water cannot possibly be found out either as drinking or not drinking water, so government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Burger, supra note 5, at 53-54. 
121 Hess, supra note 118, at 314. 
122 Jacqueline C. Wolff and Pamela Sawhney, FCPA Voluntary Disclosures: A Risk-Benefit Analysis, 2008, 
http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/97ca6c31-614b-4ace-a441-
6dab61135c65/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/3980bda8-c3b1-4f62-9df9-
7845d53e1764/FCPA%20Voluntary%20Disclosures%20-%20A%20Risk-Benefit%20Analysis.pdf; Lanny A. Breuer, 
Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, Speech at the American Bar Association National Institute on 
White Collar Crime (Feb. 25, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches-
testimony/documents/02-25-10aag-AmericanBarAssosiation.pdf (providing that “I also want to assure you that the 
Department’s commitment to meaningfully reward voluntary disclosures and full and complete corporate cooperation 
will continue to be honored in both letter and spirit.”). 
123 Burger, supra note 5, at 47; Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private Right 
of Action, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 185, 229 n. 57 (1994) (“There have been numerous occasions on which the State 
Department attempted to convince the SEC or DOJ to restrict its investigations, especially when the SEC or DOJ was 
considering whether to reveal the names of countries or officials under investigation.”). 
124 If it believes there is enough evidence for a criminal action, the SEC must refer the matter to the DOJ. According to 
the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, the DOJ is responsible for the criminal investigation and prosecution of all willful 
violations of either section of the Act and has civil enforcement powers with respect to those companies not subject to 
SEC jurisdiction. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual 9-47.110, -47.130 (2000), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia reading room/usam/title9/47mcrm.htm. 
125 See generally NOONAN, supra note 38. 
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servants employed in the government work cannot be found out (while) taking money (for 
themselves).”126Many times there is no written evidence or paper trail of illegal payments or 
corrupt business deals;127 therefore, it is difficult or nearly impossible to obtain the necessary 
evidence.128 Instead, only those intimately involved in the deal have knowledge of it. However, it 
is possible that other employees or competitors might become aware of the illegal conduct. 
Nevertheless, despite potentially having such information, before these groups can be expected to 
report the activity, they must feel that they are adequately protected by anti-retaliation or un-fair 
competition laws129 and they must believe that they will be able to recover their damages suffered. 
Currently these groups have little incentive to alert the DOJ or SEC even if they believe they will 
be protected, because fines imposed are paid to the SEC and DOJ, and not the individuals. As a 
result of the inherent difficulties in obtaining the evidence necessary to prosecute under the FCPA, 
the DOJ and SEC have recently expanded their investigation tools to include massive FBI sting 
operations.130 However, aggressive undercover action may raise the controversial issue of 
entrapment.131  The fact that such aggressive undercover investigation is necessary illustrates part 
of the challenge inherent in effectively enforcing the FCPA.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Bardhan, supra note 38, at 1320. 
127 S.J. Lochner, The Criminalization of American Extraterritorial Bribery: The Effect of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POLY. 645, 661-62 (1981). 
128 Nelson, supra note 119, at 299-302. 
129 See generally Vega, supra note 83; see infra footnote 240 and accompanying text for a discussion on 
Whistleblower statutes.   
130 Mega-Bust Is Only The Beginning, THE FCPA BLOG, Feb. 11, 2010, 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/2/11/mega-bust-is-only-the-beginning.html; Massive FCPA Indictment Unsealed, 
THE FCPA BLOG, Jan. 19, 2010, http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/1/19/massive-fcpa-indictment-unsealed.html. 
131 See e.g., Africa Sting - The Big Question, FCPA PROFESSOR, Jan. 21, 2010, 
http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2010/01/africa-sting-big-question.html.  
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C. Vague Provisions 
Furthermore, there is little predictability with prosecution under the FCPA because the 
provisions are inherently vague132 and there is almost no binding authority interpreting them.133 No 
regulations have been promulgated, very few cases have gone to trial because such a high number 
of the cases settle, and the DOJ opinion procedure134 is rarely used, and even when it is used, it 
cannot be relied upon with much certainty.135  An additional source of unpredictability stems from 
the fact that related state law claims and remedies, like the international anti-corruption laws, are 
not uniform, but instead vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.136 Finally, cultural 
differences around the world lead to varying definitions of corruption and acceptable business 
conduct,137 thus providing an additional reason for the Act’s unpredictable nature.138  
D. Inadequate Penalties 
Last, the penalties imposed for violating the Act may not be severe enough to adequately deter 
future misconduct.139 There are numerous ways that the penalties may be inadequate. First, the 
fines themselves may not be large enough to actually serve as a punishment for the bribe paid 
because the financial benefits flowing from the corrupt conduct may be greater than the fine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 This may raise constitutional concerns for the FCPA because “the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal 
statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Gonzales v. Carhart, 
550 U.S. 124, 149 (2007); see also Kolender  v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United 
States, 511 U.S. 513, 525 (1994). 
133 Pines, supra note 123, at 185, 200, 216. However, see infra footnote 235 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the possible benefits stemming from the FCPA’s vague provisions.  
134 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 80.1-80.16.  
135 Nelson, supra note 119; Vega, supra note 83, at 443-44.  
136For a summary of International anti-bribery laws see UHY Advisors, International Anti-Bribery Laws & 
Enforcement, http://www.uhyadvisors-us.com/uhy/Default.aspx?tabid=392 (last visited Apr. 19, 2010). 
137 Salbu, supra note 47, at 75.   
138 Id.     
139 Burger, supra note 5, at 47.  
21	  
	  
imposed.140 However, this risk appears to be diminishing, because at least recently, the magnitude 
of the fines imposed by the DOJ and SEC is increasing.141 A second reason a penalty may be an 
inadequate deterrent is because multiple enforcement agencies may realistically be involved in a 
single prosecution. Together, the various agencies or countries may attempt to “craft[] global 
settlements.”142 The imposed penalty therefore will serve as a joint remedy that will be shared by 
the multiple agencies or countries. The total overall penalty will run the risk of not providing full 
remedy for some of the affected agencies or countries because these interested parties will be 
required to give credit for fines paid to other agencies or countries.143 A recent example of this is 
the global settlement of just over $40 million between the British division of Innospec, Inc., the 
SEC, DOJ, and Britain’s Serious Fraud Office.144 The British judge who approved the $12.7 
million British portion of the fine said he did so “reluctantly, as it was wholly inadequate and 
should have been in the tens of millions for a very serious offence.”145 A final reason why the fines 
imposed may fail to be an adequate penalty is because in many instances the fines are paid with 
company money and do not come directly out of the pocket of the responsible individuals.  The 
DOJ and SEC likely recognize this shortcoming because they are beginning to directly prosecute 
the responsible individuals, in addition to their companies, with more frequency.146  The 
individuals then not only become personally responsible for the fines imposed, but also risk 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Corruption Barometer, supra note 111. This phenomenon may be analogized to an efficient breach of contract. See 
generally Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947 (1982).  
141 2009 FCPA Update, supra note 13, at DOJ Follows the Money. 
142 Headwinds In London, THE FCPA BLOG, Mar. 29, 2010, http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/3/29/headwinds-in-
london.html. 
143 Id.  Alternatively, the 2008 Siemens case is an example of a successful coordinated prosecution effort. Press 
Release, Dept. of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines, (Dec. 15, 2008), available at  
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html [hereinafter Siemens Press Release]. 
144 Siemens Press Release supra note 143.   
145 Id.  (internal citations omitted). 
146 FCPA Update 2009, supra note 13. 
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incarceration, which is a serious deterrent.  “As of March 1, [2010] the DOJ has 38 individuals 
awaiting trial.”147 
IV. The Need for a Private Right of Action  
A. Uncompensated Victims 
If FCPA prohibited conduct only caused harm to American’s “domestic markets and foreign 
relations,”148 than the DOJ and SEC’s sole enforcement authority may be justified. However, there 
are many other possible victims of FCPA violations, including employees, competitors, business 
partners, and shareholders. These private victims might suffer a variety of injuries. For example, 
they might lose the financial benefit that they would have earned had they received the contract 
they lost to the party who was willing to engage in the requested corrupt business activities; they 
might suffer harm to their reputation if they alert the SEC or DOJ of others’ corrupt acts; or they 
might tarnish their relationship with the foreign country to the point that obtaining future business 
is unlikely. These are only some of the reasons it is detrimental that the parties most directly 
harmed by the corrupt business practices and the parties who are in the best position to stop the 
corrupt business practices before they can be completed are not currently granted a direct private 
right of action under the FCPA. Although parties may attempt to recover indirectly for FCPA 
violations, the success of such claims is unpredictable; frequently, as will be discussed below, such 
claims are lost. 149  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Sherman & Sterling, FCPA Digest of Cases and Review Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, at 6, Mar. 4, 2010, 
http://shearman.symplicity.com/files/03f/03f164bc0bd3d772e53eff9d9cbba048.pdf.  
148 1976 FCPA Senate Report, supra note 77. 
149 More Hurdles For Private Litigants, THE FCPA BLOG, Dec. 2, 2008, 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2008/12/2/more-hurdles-for-private-litigants.html; High Velocity FCPA, THE FCPA 
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B. Engaging Multi-layered Policies 
Moreover, as already explained, corruption can be more effectively controlled by 
implementing “multi-layered policies.”150 By allowing a private right of action under the FCPA, 
the advancement of these various policies will be enhanced. First, with regard to the prevention 
policy, the private sector is in a better position to prevent corrupt business activities from being 
effectuated in the first instance. The FCPA can effectively be used as a defensive shield. As it has 
been said in many different arenas, the best offense is a good defense.151 When a company is 
approached regarding the payment of a bribe, it can refuse the opportunity by using a potential 
FCPA prosecution as a defense. Second, with regard to the State building and cultural dimension 
policies, the private sector is needed in order to implement and foster the necessary non-corrupt 
codes of conduct and culture within companies and industries.  Third, with regard to the 
enforcement policy, “[t]here is little doubt that there would be greater enforcement, and 
concomitant deterrent effect, if Congress amended the FCPA to include a direct private right of 
action.”152 Moreover, “[t]he right of civil action provides a useful complement to criminal 
proceedings as a deterrent.”153 
Specifically providing a private right of action when harm is suffered as a result of bribery 
and/or corruption is not a completely novel policy. The COE Convention and the U.N 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Suit is Tossed, THE FCPA BLOG, June 2, 2009, http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/6/3/another-fcpa-derivative-suit-
is-tossed.html. 
150 Burger, supra note 5, at 50.  
151 It is unknown who first coined this saying. 
152 Burger, supra note 5, at 54.  
153 Id. at 63.  
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Convention154 each specifically reference a private right.155 The COE Convention states in Article 
5 that: 
Each Party shall provide in its internal law for appropriate procedures for persons 
who have suffered damage as a result of an act of corruption by its public officials 
in the exercise of their functions to claim for compensation from the State or, in the 
case of a non-state Party, from that Party’s appropriate authorities (emphasis 
added).156  
Additionally, the Convention seeks additional protection for private individuals who are 
whistleblowers in Article 9 by suggesting that Parties “provide in its internal law for appropriate 
protection against any unjustified sanction for employees who have reasonable grounds to suspect 
corruption and who report in good faith their suspicion to responsible persons or authorities.”157 
Article 35 of the U.N. Convention provides:  
Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in accordance with 
principles of its domestic law, to ensure that entities or persons who have suffered 
damage as a result of an act of corruption have the right to initiate legal proceedings 
against those responsible for that damage in order to obtain compensation 
(emphasis added).158 
International anti-bribery laws are being enacted and enforced with more frequency and bite.159 
The USA already set the tone regarding the enactment of such laws,160 and it is now in a position 
to set the tone regarding the enforcement of them. When private parties are denied a right of action 
under American law, then the private parties might understandably seek remedies under foreign 
laws in foreign courts. When this occurs, the USA’s leadership role is eroded. An example of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 The U.N. Convention mandates that countries enact laws permitting private civil suits to help enforce its anti-
bribery laws. U.N. Convention, supra note 27, art 35. 
155 Burger, supra note 5, at 50-51, 69.  
156 COE Convention, supra note 26, art. 5. 
157 Id. at art. 9.  
158 U.N. Convention, supra note 27, art. 35. 
159 See generally supra footnotes 21-30 and accompanying text. 
160 A. Timothy Martin, The Development of International Bribery Law, 14 NATURAL RES. & ENVIRON. 11, 11-12 (Fall 
1999); see also Transparency International USA, Who We Are, http://www.transparency-usa.org/who/mission.html 
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is the recent complaint Jack Grynberg, an independent oilman, filed with the European 
Commission after his American remedies where exhausted when his civil fraud and RICO suits 
were dismissed in the District of Columbia.161 Although the fact that private parties might pursue 
foreign resolution over domestic resolution does not necessarily have a direct negative impact on 
American enforcement of the FCPA, it is an issue worth noting, and may be additional evidence 
for the conclusion that a direct private right is necessary under the FCPA. 
C. Current Attempted Uses of Indirect Private Rights of Action 
Because there is no direct private right, private parties have been forced to resort to alternative 
means of seeking remedy for harm caused by corrupt business practices. Although some such 
parties have had success, more frequently the parties are finding themselves exhausting their legal 
options without being provided a remedy. The wide variety in the groups of private parties 
bringing collateral civil litigation is both staggering and insightful. The variety demonstrates the 
extensive and far-reaching aspects the harm from corruption causes. In fact, “two-thirds of 
published court decisions mentioning the FCPA involve cases brought by private parties.”162 
Discharged employees, competitors, business partners, foreign governments/entities, shareholders, 
and investment funds have all recently attempted to recover damages in collateral civil 
litigation.163 The diversity of civil claims brought is also informative.  
First, shareholders have brought shareholder derivative suits alleging violations of section 
10(b), section 11, and section 20 of the securities act, common law fraud, negligent representation 
based on artificially inflated stock price, breach of fiduciary duties, waste of corporate assets, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 The FCPA Blog, Jack Grynbert Battles On, Feb. 2, 2010, http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/2/3/jack-grynberg-
battles-on.html; see Grynberg v. BP P.L.C., 596 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 2009); Grynberg v. BP P.L.C., 585 F. Supp. 
2d 50 (D.D.C. 2008). 
162 Vega, supra note 83, at 464.  
163 2009 FCPA Update, supra note 13, at Collateral Civil Litigation. 
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abuse of control, gross mismanagement, and unjust enrichment.164  Second, foreign 
governments/entities have brought claims for violations of RICO and the Robinson-Putnam Act, 
mail and wire fraud, common law fraud, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment due to 
misappropriation of funds, and breach of fiduciary duty.165 Next, competitors have alleged 
violations of RICO and the Sherman Act, intentional interference with contractual/business 
relations, and unjust competition. 166 Also, business partners have brought claims for contract 
breach, including breached distributorship agreements, common law fraud, theft/conversion, false 
light, and constructive trust claims.167 Last, employees have sought damages for wrongful or 
retaliatory discharge.168  
Some of the above claims have been successful, and at the very least, collateral parallel civil 
litigation is becoming more popular.169 Nonetheless, the plaintiffs have continued to encounter 
many obstacles to successful recovery as a result of only being able to bring indirect causes of 
action. Some of examples of these obstacles include:  high standards of proof, for example, having 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Glazer Capital Mgmt. LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2008) (alleging misrepresentation); In re Immucor Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72335 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 4, 2006) (alleging false statements); In re Nature’s Sunshine 
Products Securities Litigation, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (D. Utah 2007) (alleging securities fraud and other violations of 
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165 Integral Res. (PVT) Limited v. ISTIL Group, Inc., 155 Fed. Appx. 69, 70-71 (3d Cir. Del. 2005)(alleging tortuous 
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of Nig., 219 F.3d 869, 871 (9th Cir. Cal. 2000)(alleging breached contract claims); Castellanos v. Pfizer, Inc., 2008 
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2008); Complaint, Iraq v. ABB AG, No. 08 CV 5951 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2008). 
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167 Compagnia Importazioni Esportazioni Rappresentanze v. L-3 Communs. Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25500 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2010)(alleging breach of contract, fraudulent concealment, breach of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing, and quantum meruit); Forum Publications, Inc. v. P.T. Publishers, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 236, 237 (E.D. Pa. 
1988); Verified Complaint and Jury Demand, Grynberg v. B.P. P.L.C., No. 1:08-cv-00301-JDB (D.C. Feb. 21, 2008); 
Complaint, Agro-Tech Corp. v. Yamada Corp., No. 1:08CV0721 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2008). 
168 Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2009); Haddad v. ITT Industries, Inc., 2007 WL 141949 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 
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to establish a pattern of corrupt behavior under RICO or knowledge of the corrupt activities under 
a claim for breach of fiduciary duties,170 the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,171 lack of 
subpoena power, and application of foreign law as a result of choice of law rules.172 
Before the FCPA was enacted, American corporations could only be prosecuted domestically 
for corrupt payments or bribes though indirect means, 173  such as through the securities laws174, 
the Bank Secrecy Act175, the Travel Act, 176or the Mail177 or Wire Fraud Acts.178 However, because 
it was realized that “such indirect means of preventing foreign bribery were ineffective,” the FCPA 
was enacted to serve as a “more direct and effective means of enforcement.”179 The overall 
ineffectiveness of indirect enforcement of bribery and corruption has already been recognized once 
by this country in the past; therefore, the need to provide a direct right of action for private 
plaintiffs presumptively should only be an extension of this already understood and acknowledged 
principle.  
V. Possible Solutions 
A. An Implied Right? 
 Private rights of action may be established in two ways. Either the private right is expressly 
provided for in the statute, which as already explained is not the case with the FCPA, or the private 
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172 This has resulted in holding directors of foreign companies that do business in the USA to a lower standard than 
USA company directors are held to while acting in the USA. The FCPA Blog, BAE Bribe Suit Tossed On Appeal, Jan. 
2, 2010, http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/1/4/bae-bribe-suit-tossed-on-appeal.html.  
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174 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C §§ 77a--77aa (2000); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b—77e, 
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176 18 U.S.C. § 1952. 
177 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 
178 18 U.S.C. § 1343. 
179 Pines, supra note 143, at 187-88. 
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right is determined by the judicial system to be implied.180 The courts that have addressed whether 
the FCPA impliedly authorizes a private right of action have answered the question in the 
negative.181 The Supreme Court has held that the existence of an implied private right of action 
depends on the determination of congressional intent.182 Given the legislative history of the FCPA, 
it is not entirely clear that there should not be an implied right of action based on the determination 
of congressional intent.  
On one side of the argument, the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance of the 
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the 95th Congress, the Congress that 
enacted the FCPA, stated in its report “the Committee intends that the courts shall recognize a 
private cause of action based on this legislation, as they have in cases involving other provisions of 
the Securities Exchange Act, on behalf of persons who suffer injury as a result of prohibited 
corporate bribery.”183 The SEC Chairman, Harold M. Williams, testified at that time that “this 
legislation would furnish the Commission and private plaintiffs ... with potent new tools to employ 
against those who commit corporate bribery.”184 On the other hand, there were also statements 
from both Senators and House Representatives that the drafting Committee did not intend for the 
courts to imply a private right for plaintiffs.185 Also, although the original draft of the Senate’s 
version of the FCPA expressly included a private right, this provision was subsequently deleted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Vega, supra note 83, at 459. 
181 See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal of private FCPA action for 
failure to state a claim), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1086 (1991); see also Lewis v. Sporck, 612 F. Supp. 1316, 1333 (D.C. 
Cal. 1985) (FCPA accounting provisions do not imply private right of action). 
182 See Touche Ross & Co. v. Remington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979) (holding “the central inquiry remains whether 
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before the bill was passed.186 The specific meaning behind this subsequent deletion is the subject 
of an academic debate.187 It may be argued that “[t]he provision’s removal would seem to suggest 
that Congress did not intend to make private suits possible.”188 Alternatively, it is possible that “the 
likely reason Congress deleted the language was to avoid undermining the implied rights of action 
that had already been inferred by courts under the Securities Exchange Act.”189 Despite the fact 
that the true congressional intent regarding the existence or non-existence of a private right is by 
no means obvious, at least with regard to the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions190, and in light of the 
fact that courts have found an implied private right of action in numerous other federal statutes,191 
“the few commentators arguing in favor of a private FCPA right have uniformly concluded the 
statute should be amended to expressly include a limited private right of action.”192 
B. Existing Academic and Legislative Remedies 
Before addressing the issue of amending the FCPA, it is important to recognize that 
commentators have suggested other means of enhancing the effectiveness of the Act. One 
possibility is to encourage the private sector, including competing companies, international 
organizations, multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank, non-governmental 
organizations, such as Transparency International, and a not-yet-developed specialized plaintiff’s 
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bar, to “lead the next stage in the global fight against corruption.”193 Additionally, existing causes 
of action, other than the FCPA, could be expanded to provide assistance to private parties seeking 
remedy. One example is employee whistleblower protection under the Securities Exchange Act.194  
In fact, “on March 15, [2010] Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd (D-CT) 
released his much-anticipated financial reform bill… [that] establishes a new program to reward 
whistleblowers who assist the SEC in an investigation of securities violations such as violations of 
the FCPA.”195 Whistleblowers who provide “original information” that leads to a successful FCPA 
action or other “related actions” and that results in the payment of fines exceeding one million 
dollars will receive between ten and thirty percent of the fine that the government collects.196 
Although the future of this bill is unknown, it is relevant to this notes theme, and if nothing more, 
its development or lack of development will be interesting to follow. 
1. A Limited Private Right for American Competitors 
As early as 1994, at least one commentator already recognized that amending the FCPA to 
include a private right of action could remedy two fundamental problems with the FCPA that 
prevented the Act from fulfilling its purpose.197 The two identified problems were the DOJ’s and 
SEC’s ineffective enforcement and the vagueness of the FCPA’s provisions.198 To remedy these 
problems, and to “allow American businesses to realize the FCPA’s dormant benefits,” the 
commentator suggested that the Act should be amended “to allow a private right of action that is 
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restricted to competing American businesses.”199 By granting a private right, the commentator 
concluded that enforcement would indirectly become more effective because the courts would be 
forced to clarify the vague provisions of the Act and because companies would have an added 
incentive to use the DOJ review procedure.200 The suggested amendment limited prospective 
plaintiffs to American businesses in order “to allow fair competition.”201 At the time the 
commentator suggested the amendment, many foreign governments did not have statutes similar to 
the FCPA and international conventions were less active;202 therefore, the commentator did not 
think that American businesses should fear being sued by foreign businesses for conduct that the 
foreign businesses could not be conversely sued for in their home countries.203 The proposal did 
not grant a private right of action to shareholders or employees, because although recognizing their 
potential vulnerability to FCPA violations, the commentator believed that these groups did not 
have “the same long-term interests as the company,” that it would be hard for these groups to 
acquire sufficient evidence to prove their distinct harm, and that publicly held companies should 
not bear a greater FCPA enforcement burden than privately held companies.204   
While respecting the commentator’s early recognition of FCPA ineffectiveness, limiting a 
private right of action to competitors, and denying a private right to shareholders and employees, 
would not significantly resolve any of the Act’s current inefficiencies. Employees may be in the 
best position to have actual knowledge of corrupt practices and they likely are in the best position 
to help institute changes in the company’s culture. Also, by acknowledging the difficulties of 
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proving a distinct harm and gathering the evidence needed to support indirect causes of action, 
without providing a direct cause of action, this commentator highlighted the fact that these groups 
have little incentive to attempt to stop or remedy the corrupt activities because of the reality that 
they are not allowed to recover for their efforts.  
2. H.R. 2152—A Limited Private Right Against Foreign Concerns 
On June 4, 2008, H.R. 6188, the Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2008 was 
introduced to the House by Rep. Ed Perlmutter, a Democrat from Colorado.205  The bill was 
referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and the House Committee on the 
Judiciary; however, the committees never reported on the bill, the bill was never voted on, the 
session expired, and the bill was removed from the books. 206 On April 28, 2009, Rep. Ed 
Perlmutter introduced H.R. 2152, the Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2009, which is 
identical to the expired H.R. 6188.207 On June 12, 2009, H.R. 2152 was again referred to the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce and the House Committee on the Judiciary, which further 
referred the bill to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security.208 As of the 
writing of this note, there is no additional reported activity regarding the bill.209 
Generally, the bill authorizes “issuers”, “domestic concerns”, and “United States persons” to 
sue “foreign concerns” when damage is caused to domestic business.210 Under the proposed 
amendment to the FCPA, a plaintiff must first prove that the defendant foreign concern made a 
corrupt payment to a foreign official for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business for or with, 
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or directing business to, any person.211 Second, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant foreign 
concern’s illegal, corrupt payment “prevented the plaintiff from obtaining or retaining business for 
or with any person” and “assisted the foreign concern in obtaining or retaining such business.”212 
In reality, the burden of proof a plaintiff must bear is almost impossibly high. However, a plaintiff 
who is able to satisfy these statutory requirements would be able to recover the higher of either 
“the total amount of the contract or agreement that the defendant gained in obtaining or retaining 
business by means of” the illegally made payment or “the total amount of the contract or 
agreement that the plaintiff failed to gain because of the defendant’s obtaining or retaining 
business by means of” the illegally made payment.”213 Additionally, the proposed amendment 
requires treble damages. 214  
Although the USA has been described as having a “historic resistance…to private actions 
combating foreign bribery,”215 the introduction of H.R. 6188 and H.R. 2152 possibly offers insight 
as to whether or not the USA will “follow[] the international community’s lead216 by opening its 
courts to such litigation.”217 Also, despite this “historic resistance,” at least one commentator has 
suggested “that more viable reforms may be effected through broader public policy changes.”218 
Additionally, H.R. 2152 has been referred to as a “game-changer in terms of FCPA 
enforcement.”219 Since a private plaintiff will not be able to craft settlements with a defendant that 
include a non-prosecution/ deferred prosecution agreement or consent decree, options currently 
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used by the DOJ and SEC with frequency,220 more FCPA claims will go to trial, “[w]hich means 
that a court will actually be called upon to construe FCPA elements and legal theories of 
liability.”221 
At first glance, this bill may reasonably attempt to solve some of the previously discussed 
shortfalls of the current FCPA, including the inherent vagueness of the Act’s provisions; however, 
ultimately this bill is an ineffective solution for multiple reasons. First, under the amendment, a 
plaintiff would only be able to sue foreign companies, and not American companies or individuals. 
This means that many of the collateral civil causes of action discussed above would not be 
transformed into legitimate FCPA actions.  Second, by its terms the Act would “exclude as 
prospective plaintiffs companies that are the foreign subsidiaries of US firms while permitting 
foreign companies which are issuers to bring actions against non-US companies, including foreign 
subsidiaries of US firms.”222 The practical effect of the bill’s language therefore makes little sense. 
It has been suggested that the bills appear to be:  
geared toward addressing concerns that the FCPA places U.S.-based global 
companies at a disadvantage because (1) the FCPA’s application to “domestic 
concerns” makes their liability exposure broader than that of their foreign 
competitors, and (2) the authorities in their foreign competitors’ home countries do 
not enforce anti-bribery laws as aggressively as the DOJ and the SEC enforce the 
FCPA.223 
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Whether or not the FCPA actually places American companies at a competitive disadvantage is a 
separate subject of academic debate.224 Regardless, realistically, the amendment would do little to 
seriously remedy the present inadequacies of the FCPA, especially in light of the high burden of 
proof plaintiffs would be required to satisfy. 
C. A New Amendment to the FCPA—Granting A Broad Private Right 
As Gandhi once said, “[c]orruption and hypocrisy ought not to be inevitable products of 
democracy, as they undoubtedly are today.”225 One of the worst reasons to continue to do 
something is because it is the way it has always been done in the past. By accepting bribes, big or 
small, as an unfortunate reality of the business world, all nations and all people are harmed. 
Despite domestic and international efforts to enact laws in order to combat corruption and bribery, 
the fight is a far cry from being won.226 Domestically, the FCPA is receiving unprecedented 
attention.227 The DOJ’s resources and ability to work effectively with the SEC and other foreign 
governments in order to prosecute violators under the Act are improving.228 Internationally, 
foreign governments and conventions are passing new laws and starting to enforce with more 
authority both new and old laws.229  
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The USA could improve its own enforcement abilities by paying attention to some of these 
foreign enacted laws. For example, the OECD Convention is the “landmark” anti-bribery 
convention and the OECD continues to be both active and innovative in regards to the international 
battle against corruption and bribery.230 For this reason, in the remaining sections, this note will 
specifically reference the OECD Convention in discussing how the FCPA should be amended.   
Evidencing their commitment to “stepping up their fight against bribery and corruptions,” 
thirty OECD member countries, including the USA, and eight others recently signed the 
Recommendation for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business.231 The Recommendations include:  
Ensur[ing] companies cannot avoid sanctions by using agents and intermediaries to 
bribe for them; Periodically review[ing] policies and approach on small facilitation 
payments; Improv[ing] co-operation between countries on foreign bribery 
investigations and the seizure, confiscation and recovery of the proceeds of 
transnational bribery; Provid[ing] effective channels for reporting foreign bribery to 
law enforcement authorities and for protecting whistleblowers from retaliation; and 
Working more closely with the private sector to adopt more stringent internal 
controls, ethics and compliance programmes and measures to prevent and detect 
bribery.232 
 
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has stated that “[t]he United States fully supports the 
OECD’s anti-corruption agenda,”233 which is interesting considering some of the OECD’s 
commitments regarding facilitating payments, whistleblower protections, and the private sector. 
Although difficult to establish with any certainty, the fact that senior DOJ and SEC officials of the 
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Obama Administration have continued to promise “a robust program of enforcement,”234 is 
evidence that corruption and bribery in the USA are as prevalent as ever. This prevalence is at least 
partially a result of the FCPA’s inadequacies that have already been discussed.  
The first place to start in remedying this fact is the federal statute that makes such conduct 
illegal, the FCPA. As already explained, one of the primary criticisms of the FCPA is the Act’s 
vagueness.235 However, in amending the Act, the focus should not be on clarifying the vague 
provisions. The Act’s vagueness is arguably an asset to the battle against corruption. By not clearly 
defining prohibited conduct, the Act keeps companies guessing as to whether or not their desired 
business conduct will result in an FCPA prosecution. This can serve as a powerful deterrent. If 
prohibited conduct was clearly defined, then companies and individuals would always act in a way 
that would allow them to stay just out of reach of a FCPA prosecution. For example, if on a linear 
scale conduct A-J was legal and conduct K-Z were illegal, companies would continually act at 
point J. Clearly defining conduct K-Z as illegal would merely encourage companies to find 
innovative ways of engaging in activities or manipulating records in such a way as to just avoid 
committing a FCPA violation, despite the reality that the requisite corrupt intent may realistically 
be present. This would do nothing to further the ultimate goal of suppressing the prevalence of 
corruption and bribery or deterring its occurrence and acceptance.   
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 Shearman & Sterling, FCPA Digest of Cases and Review Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977,  at 6, Mar. 4, 2010, 
http://shearman.symplicity.com/files/03f/03f164bc0bd3d772e53eff9d9cbba048.pdf. 
235 See generally Pines, supra note 143. 
38	  
	  
1. Possible Private Party Plaintiffs 
Instead, unlike some other commentators’ suggestions, the FCPA should be amended to grant 
a broad, rather than limited, direct right of action.236 According to the Ernst & Young Survey, 
stakeholders who are negatively impacted by foreign bribery include: investors, customers, general 
public employees, financial regulators, suppliers, media, and NGO’s.237 Although in the survey’s 
responses there were significant regional variations in regards to which stakeholders were the most 
negatively affected, twenty nine percent of respondents cited “shareholder/competitor litigation as 
a negative impact of engaging in corrupt practices.238 The fact that collateral civil litigation is a 
recognized burden is a good thing; it provides evidence that expanding the FCPA to include a 
broad private right of action would help curb the frequency of foreign bribery by acting as a useful 
deterrent. Although the argument has been made that granting a private right of action for foreign 
bribery would “effectively place industry regulation in the hands of private litigants rather that the 
U.S. government,”239 because of the benefits stemming from providing a direct private right would 
have on increasing the effectiveness of current FCPA enforcement and the inherent safeguards 
against frivolous litigation, in order to effectively combat foreign corruption and bribery, the 
private sector ought be granted a direct right of action under the FCPA.   
So long as jurisdiction is otherwise proper, this right should be granted to employees, both 
whistleblowers and non-whistleblowers, both domestic and foreign; competitors, both domestic 
and foreign; shareholders; and foreign governments, so long as the foreign government has either 
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signed an international agreement or is a member of an international convention relating to corrupt 
business practices that the USA supports or has a domestic law similar to the FCPA. The reason a 
broad private right should be granted is because there is an inherent check against frivolous claims 
built into the nature of FCPA claims. Each private group that would be granted the right has an 
incentive to avoid bringing unnecessary or nuisance litigation. Employees run the risk of receiving 
a tarnished reputation or being fired and having to satisfy requirements under whistleblower 
statutes for protection.240 Competitors and foreign governments that directly control businesses, 
despite significant differences in the resources of the two groups, have similar interests at stake. 
They also run the risk of receiving a tarnished reputation, which could lead to additional lost 
business opportunities. Moreover, they risk having their own practices closely scrutinized by other 
industry participants, foreign countries, or the DOJ and SEC. Also, as earlier discussed, the FCPA 
only criminalizes the supply side of a corrupt business transaction; however, by granting a private 
right to foreign government controlled businesses, this might act as an indirect regulator of the 
demand side of bribery as well. If a foreign government owned business learns of another foreign 
government’s officials making bribes, the government owned business could inform its own 
government officials of the bribe, and these officials could then use the FCPA as a defensive 
shield, which overtime may reduce the prevalence of bribes being initiated by the supply side. 
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Finally, shareholders of domestic, foreign government owned, and foreign privately owned 
businesses risk tangible loss to stock prices or intangible loss to company good will.241   
2. Burdens of Proof 
Employees bringing suit should be required to prove that they suffered a particularized and 
definite harm as a result of a defendant’s FCPA violation. Likely situations are that an employee is 
discharged after alleging a FCPA violation, reporting a FCPA violation, or refusing to complete a 
job responsibility because the task would include a FCPA violation. In regards to alleging or 
reporting a FCPA violation, the Act should be amended to include an “up-the-ladder reporting 
system” similar to what is required under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.242 Employees should be 
required to report in-house before they report to the SEC or DOJ. A whistleblower hotline is one 
possibility to assist the up-the-ladder reporting requirement. According to the Ernst & Young 
Survey, although less than one third of respondents provided that a whistleblower hotline would be 
a measure “most successful” in lowering the risk of foreign bribery, “North American companies 
were much more enthusiastic about whistleblower hotlines than any other region.”243 In fact, 
seventy seven percent of North American companies believed whistleblower hotlines would be 
successful.244 This requirement would therefore likely provide further incentive for companies to 
implement effective FCPA compliance programs. Also, by first requiring the in-house reporting, 
the likelihood that a corrupt payment or activity may be all together avoided is greater, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 This statement does not mean to suggest that in all circumstances will an FCPA prosecution result in recoverable 
loss to good-will. Negative media attention may be received during a FCPA prosecution; however, it is possible that 
shareholders could bring suit, conduct discovery, and then settle in a confidential agreement never made public. It may 
be argued that this is legalized extortion, blackmail, or greenmail. However, if there is no merit to the shareholders 
claim, then the company will likely not settle in the first instance. It is acknowledged that in order to recovery for 
either tangible or intangible loss, the shareholders must prove that the company affirmatively did something that 
directly resulted in the loss.  
242 Nelson, supra note 119; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
243 Global Fraud Survey, supra note 35. 
244 Id.   
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would do more to further the goals of the FCPA than reporting directly to the SEC or DOJ would. 
In regards to refusing to complete a job responsibility because the task would include a FCPA 
violation, in all likelihood, by refusing to fulfill the task, the employee would be fired or demoted. 
In this instance, the employee might be protected as a whistleblower.245 However, when the 
company learns that the employee refused to complete the task, instead of allowing the task to go 
unaccomplished, the company will instead find another employee to complete it. For example, if 
one employee refuses to accompany a foreign government official on an all expense paid elaborate 
trip, the company will merely find a different employee to do so. In this instance, the purpose of 
the FCPA is not furthered, because in the end, the unlawful activity is still effectuated. For this 
reason, the employee who refuses to complete the task initially, after being required to satisfy in-
house reporting requirements, should be able to seek an injunction prohibiting the task from being 
completed in appropriate situations.  
Similar to H.R. 2152, domestic competitors and foreign government owned businesses 
bringing suit should be required to prove that a company, either domestic or foreign, violated the 
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, and that the violation prevented the plaintiff from obtaining or 
retaining business while assisting the defendant company  in obtaining or retaining the business. 
The plaintiff should be required to prove these elements with substantial certainty, but not absolute 
certainty. Although plaintiffs should carry a heavy burden, they should not carry an impossible 
one. A plaintiff who, as a result of a third-party’s bribe, is unable to effectively compete for or 
negotiate a contract, must be able to prove with substantial certainty that it was prohibited from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 See Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. §1221 and The United States Department of Labor, 
Employment Law Guide, Whistleblower and Retaliation Protections, 
http://www.dol.gov/compliance/guide/whistle.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).  
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either obtaining or retaining business. Merely alleging the lost opportunity to fairly or fully 
participate in the bidding process in the first instance will not be sufficient to support a claim.  
Last, shareholders bringing suit should, like employees, be required to prove that they suffered 
a particularized and definite harm as a result of a FCPA violation. It may be argued that allowing 
shareholders to bring a private action against a company only after the company has already been 
prosecuted by the DOJ or SEC would allow the shareholders to piggy-back off the DOJ and/or 
SEC’s investigation without having to carry much of a burden on their own. However, because the 
DOJ and SEC penalties are paid to the agencies, if the shareholders were estopped from benefiting 
from the DOJ and/or SEC’s investigations, those shareholders would not receive any compensation 
for the harm that the FCPA violation caused. For example, if the shareholders can prove with 
substantial certainty, not necessarily mathematical certainty, that the stock price of the company 
fell a certain amount or that the company reputation or good-will was diminished by a certain 
value, then these shareholders should be able to recover for this harm suffered. 
3. Available Remedies 
Under the amended Act, available the remedies must remain flexible. In different 
circumstances, either legal or equitable relief may be granted. If evidence is obtained regarding the 
substantial likelihood that a corrupt payment will be made, then injunctive relief prohibiting the 
payment from being effectuated is appropriate. In the more likely situation where the corrupt 
payment will not be discovered or stopped before being effectuated, compensatory damages are 
appropriate. Private parties may receive treble damages. The reason for this is that without treble 
damages, keeping in mind the significant risks to each group that have already been discussed, 
there arguably is not sufficient incentive for private parties to bring a claim. If damages in excess 
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of treble damages are granted, then the additional punitive damages should be disgorged to the 
DOJ and SEC. This could help provide the DOJ and SEC with adequate resources to improve 
effective prosecution under the Act. Although it may be very difficult for private parties to 
ultimately prove damages to the level of certainty required under the amendment, since treble 
damages could force defendant companies into bankruptcy or reorganization, and in light of the 
underlying goal of the FCPA to strengthen the global marketplace by limiting corruption, such 
strong burden of proof requirements are necessary.246  
4. Affirmative Defenses and Exceptions 
The affirmative defenses247 currently existing under the FCPA should also apply to private 
claims. These include that “the payment was lawful under the written laws of the foreign country” 
and “that the money was spent as part of demonstrating a product or performing a contractual 
obligation.”248 However, the fact that a company voluntary disclosed its illegal or suspicious 
conduct to the DOJ or SEC should not bar private parties from having the ability to bring a 
subsequent private right of action.  An initial voluntary disclosure should not be an available 
defense in regards to additional civil litigation brought against defendant companies. However, it 
may be the situation that a company voluntarily discloses a potential FCPA violation to the SEC or 
DOJ and then incurs significant costs relating to an internal investigation.249 Although in this 
instance shareholders will be able to prove affirmative action on the part of the company in 
spending corporate funds and may seek to be compensated for the cost, shareholders should not be 
able to recover for such internal investigation costs.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 Nelson, supra note 119. 
247 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c), -2(c), -3(c). 
248 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c), -2(c), -3(c). 
249 See e.g. Avon: A Pound Of Cure, THE FCPA BLOG, May 3, 2010, 
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On the other hand, the current grease or facilitating payment exception for routine 
governmental action250 should be removed. Although the DOJ has provided that “‘routine 
governmental action’ does not include any decision by a foreign official to award new business or 
to continue business with a particular party,”251 there is too much room for manipulation and abuse 
for this exception to remain. Arguably, by definition, an exception is only needed if it can be 
established that the elements underlying the offense have been or may likely be satisfied. One of 
the elements for a FCPA bribery prosecution is corrupt intent. By including grease or facilitating 
payments as an exception, congress acknowledged that corrupt intent may exist with regards to 
these payments. Although the argument may be made that it would be impossible to prove corrupt 
intent with regards to facilitating payments, if nothing else, the existence of the exception concedes 
that there is at least the possibility of the existence of something distinctive or above and beyond 
fair business procedure occurring in the business transaction. The argument may also be made that 
facilitating payments are not made in order to obtain or retain business. A weakness of this 
argument is that in some instances the facilitating payment, for example the granting of a license, 
may be the first step in the ultimate acquisition or retention of business. In the circumstance that 
the facilitating payment is more removed from the business transaction, for example the granting 
of a visa or the provision of phone service, the argument may still be made that these actions 
constitute early steps in the ultimate acquisition of business. These facilitating actions therefore 
still set the ultimate acquisition or retention of business in motion. While not intending to suggest 
that every early step in the ultimate acquisition of a business deal should be the proper subject of a 
FCPA prosecution, it is important to acknowledge the possibility of manipulation and abuse 
regarding facilitating payments. Once a party begins making facilitating payment deals with a 
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251 Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 81. 
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foreign official, the foreign official likely has that party under his control, and the possibility of 
future corrupt conduct is only magnified. Thus, as the earlier argument regarding vagueness under 
the Act suggested, including the grease or facilitating payment exception only opens the door for 
additional future abuses.  
The OECD convention recognizes “the corrosive effect of small facilitation payments.”252 The 
convention encourages member states to “periodically review their policies and approach on small 
facilitation payments,” “encourage companies to prohibit or discourage the use of small facilitation 
payments,” and urges them to enact laws with an eye to “stopping the solicitation and acceptance 
of small facilitation payments .253 True business expenses are and will continue to be tax 
deductible; however, in order to effectively begin to suppress corruption, the grease or facilitating 
payment exception must be removed. By removing the exception, it will not be the case that the 
granting of a license or the provision of a routine service will automatically be the subject of FCPA 
prosecutions; it must be remembered that each of the required elements under the Act will still 
need to be satisfied in order for the conduct to be an actionable FCPA offense.  
5. No Materiality Requirement 
With the facilitating payment exception removed, the Act should not be amended to include a 
new type of materiality requirement. This is because all corruption and bribery, regardless of its 
degree, harms the global market place, and by choosing to regulate large-scale as opposed to 
merely minor corrupt practices, the Act would no longer deter such activities, but instead would 
encourage companies to find innovative ways to guarantee their corrupt practices always remain 
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below the minimum threshold. Specifically including a materiality requirement may be contrary to 
the original drafters’ intent. For example, it was important to the original drafters that the tax 
deductibility of all bribes be eliminated.254 They were “concerned that other governments allowed 
their corporations to deduct such payments against their income tax and thus tacitly approved the 
practice.”255By providing incentive to companies to find innovative ways to classify their corrupt 
practices, it may be argued that such deceitful practices would be supported256 and indirectly 
“tacitly approved.”257 
Another reason for not having a materiality requirement is because, as already explained, it is 
only the supply side, and not the demand side, of bribery that can be prosecuted under the FCPA. 
There is no way to control what exactly, in type, quantity or value, the foreign official is offering 
to the prospective bribe-accepting party. The bribe-offering foreign official’s culture likely dictates 
his behavior, and this culture is not subject to FCPA control. By requiring that the prospective 
bribe-accepting party deny participating in all bribes, the culture of the parties actually subjected to 
FCPA enforcement has the best opportunity of being controlled and shaped. Not having a 
materiality requirement will allow the FCPA to be used successfully as a defensive shield in more 
situations.  
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The OECD convention does not specifically have a materiality requirement, although 
comment 9 does provide that “small ‘facilitation’ payments do not constitute payments made ‘to 
obtain or retain business or other improper advantage’”.258 
6. DOJ and SEC Investigation Stays 
As a general rule, a DOJ or SEC investigation should stay a private parties right under the 
Act. This is because the goal of the amendment is to increase the effectiveness of the FCPA, and if 
an investigation into a company’s activities is already occurring, then one of the Act’s purposes is 
being fulfilled. The DOJ and SEC have greater subpoena powers than private parties.259 
Additionally, Fifth Amendment rights may inhibit successful prosecution if private parties are 
concurrently investigating claims.260 Once the DOJ or SEC’s investigation is ended, the stay will 
be lifted, and the private parties will be able to seek recovery under a direct private right of action. 
Conclusion 
Corruption, including the bribing of foreign officials, is a serious concern that imposes costs 
both domestically and internationally.261 In order to effectively enforce the prohibition against such 
activities, and to further the purpose underlying the FCPA of limiting and controlling such 
activities, the FCPA must be amended to include a private right of action. There is much 
inefficiency with the Act as it exists today, some that this note has attempted to address, and 
others, including the fact that “[w]hile the FCPA has an impressive reach with regard to bribery of 
public officials, it does not touch two related areas of corruption: business-to-business bribes and 
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business-to-quasi-public official bribes,”262 that are beyond the scope of this note. However, as the 
saying goes, before you can run you must walk, and before all forms of corruption can be 
attempted to be remedied, the bribery of public officials must be more successfully controlled. 
Responsible business relationships between companies and foreign public officials and 
governments must be the initial goal. If change is able to be effectuated with regards to these 
powerful and influential groups, then the more general battle against all corruption has a much 
greater chance of success.  
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